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Introduction
Antarctica is increasingly important because of its resources. Glowing jour-
nalistic accounts of oil and natural gas deposits have been common in recent
years.' Although the era of mineral and petroleum exploitation has not yet ar-
rived, the possibility looms in the distance. The United States and the Soviet
Union have begun exploration for hard minerals. 2 The Japanese and the
Soviets are currently exploiting Antarctic krill,' a tiny crustacean which lives
mostly within a hundred-mile radius of the permanent ice pack. Antarctic
icebergs may soon be utilized to bring fresh water to areas of the world be-
sieged by drought. Detailed plans have already been formulated to tow Ant-
arctic icebergs to Southern California and Saudi Arabia.'
*A.B. (1973) Middlebury College; M.A. (1974), Ph.D. Candidate, The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy; J.D. (May 1978), Rutgers Law School; Law Clerk to the Honorable Baruch Seid-
man, Judge of the N.J. Appellate Division (commencing August 1978).
'For a sampling of such articles, see Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 1; id., March 23, 1973,
at 19, col. 4; Christian Sci. M., Dec, 20, 1976, at 1, col. 1; 187 SCIENCE 820 (March 7, 1975).
'A current U.S. project funded by the National Science Foundation is focused on the Dufek In-
trusive, an area said to be similar to South Africa's mineral-rich bush veld. See D. Salisbury, Pro-
spectingfor Antarctic Riches, Christian Sci. M., Dec. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 1. A new Soviet station
was announced by Tass in 1975, its major function to serve as a base for mineral prospecting in the
area west of the Trans-Antarctic Mountains. See M. Browne, Soviet Plans New Station on Shores
of Antarctica, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1975, at 7, col. 3.
'The Soviets were the first to exploit Antarctic krill and continue to lead in its production. In
1962 they began research and two years later they sent the first ship to Antarctica to catch krill.
During the 1974-75 season the Soviets took an estimated 200,000 tons of krill from Antarctica. See
P. Hagan, The Singular Krill, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 40, col. 1. The
Japanese government first sent a fishing vessel to Antarctica to catch krill during the 1972-73
season. It came back with 60 tons of krill, and the following season with 600 tons. The first com-
mercial boat to catch and process krill was sent to Antarctica by Nippon Suisan, Japan's largest
fishing company, in November 1974. See Krill Offers Hope of New Food Source, Christian Sci.
M., Nov. 29, 1974, at 3A, col. 4 (Eastern ed.).
'Saudi Arabia recently commissioned a French firm, the Cicero Company, to study the feasibil-
ity of towing icebergs from Antarctica to the Red Sea port of Jidda. Spokesmen for the Cicero
Company hope that the study will lead to a contract to begin actual operations as early as 1977.
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The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the legal status quo in
Antarctica will be able to withstand the stress posed by future resource ex-
ploitation. If speculation as to the importance of Antarctica's resources has lit-
tle basis in fact, the present Antarctic regime may endure for a number of
years. On the other hand, commercial exploitation of Antarctic oil, for exam-
ple, could result in significant international conflict in the near future. Even
the perception that Antarctica has important resources could inflict a severe
blow to the delicate political balance on the continent.
Legal Background
Antarctica has attracted the interest of major powers and other nations ever
since its discovery by Europeans 150 years ago. National claims to Antarctica
and a multilateral treaty combine to form a complex legal legacy.
Seven nations have made claims to Antartica. The earliest claims were made
by the United Kingdom,' New Zealand," Australia,7 France,' and Norway.'
Each of these claims did not conflict, the five nations implicitly recognizing
each other's claims. The neat delineation of claims by the five European and
Commonwealth nations was disturbed in 1940 when Chile asserted sovereignty
to an Antarctic sector, mostly contained in the territory claimed by the
British.' 0 Argentina has since claimed part of the sector claimed by Chile and
See Saudi Arabia Commissions Iceberg Study, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1976, at 2, col. 3. The Rand
Corporation formulated the towing plan for Southern California. See J. HULT AND N.
OSTRANDER, ANTARCTIC ICEBERGS AS A GLOBAL FRESH WATER SOURCE (1973).
'The United Kingdom established the first claim to all islands and territories between 20' W and
80' W longitude below 500 S latitude in a Letters Patent on July 21, 1908. See 46 U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, 1948-49 231 (1950). This claim was amended on
March 28, 1917 to include 200 W to'500 W longitude below 50' S latitude and 500 W to 800 W
longitude below 580 S latitude. See id., at 233.
'New Zealand claimed the Ross Dependency by a July 30, 1923 Order in Council of the U.K.
directed to the Governor of New Zealand. The Ross Dependency was established to include "all
the islands and territories between the 160th degree of East Longitude and 150th degree of West
Longitude which are situated south of the 60th degree of South Latitude." Id. at 235.
'Australia made the last of the Commonwealth claims by an Order in Council dated Feb. 7, 1933
which includes the area south of 600 S latitude between 450 E and 160 ° E longitude except for
Addlie Land. See I HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 462 (1940).
'France had placed Addlie Land under the jurisdiction of the colonial government of
Madagascar by Presidential Decree of Nov. 21, 1924. See supra note 5, at 229. The limits of Addlie
Land were established by a Presidential Decree of April 1, 1938: "islands and territories situated
to the south of the 60th parallel of S latitude and between the 136th and 142nd meridians of
longitude East of Greenwich." Supra note 7, at 459.
'Norway informed the Department of State on January 14, 1939 that by Royal Proclamation
issued the same day it had claimed the coast of the Antarctic continent between 20° W and 45 0 E
longitude, the area between the British and Australian claims. See supra note 7, at 460.
0Chile claimed the Antarctic sector between 53 6-W and 900 W longitude on Nov. 6, 1940. See
supra note 5, at 224.
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most of the remainder of the British territory not claimed by Chile."
Five nations involved in Antarctic exploration, which were original
signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, have not made territorial claims. This
group includes the United States, the Soviet Union, Belgium, South Africa,
and Japan." The United States maintains the position that it will not recognize
the claims of any country, will not make Antarctic claims itself, and reserves
its basic historic rights in Antarctica.' 3 The Soviet position is similar to that of
the United States.' 4
President Eisenhower took the initiative in 1958 to invite the twelve nations
with Antarctic interests" to formulate a plan which would keep Antarctica
open to all nations for scientific or other peaceful purposes. '6 The result of his
initiative was the Antarctic Treaty which entered into force on June 23, 1961,
when ratification was completed by all twelve signatories.' 7
The basic goals of the Antarctic Treaty are set forth in the first few articles.
The continent is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.' 8 Any measures
I'In a decree published on February 28, 1957, Argentina re-established the National Territory of
Tierra del Fuego, the Antarctic, and the Islands of the South Atlantic so as to include the sector
between 25 * and 74 * W longitude. See 9 POLAR RECORD 52-53 (1958). This claim overlaps the prior
Chilean claim from 530 to 740 W longitude, and is entirely contained in the British sector.
"Japan is perhaps a reluctant member of the group. The Treaty of Peace with Japan provides in
Article 2, paragraph (e) that: "Japan renounces all claims to any right or title to or interest in con-
nection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese na-
tionals or otherwise." Done at San Francisco, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.1.A.S. 2490, 136
U.N.T.S. 45.
"See E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, 107-108 (1976). In
1939 President Roosevelt instructed Admiral Byrd not to announce any territorial claim to Antarc-
tica during his expedition. The President's instruction gives some idea of the method whereby
American explorers informally assert a claim, and permits the United States to reserve its rights.
Roosevelt's instructions to Byrd contained the following paragraph: "(f) The United States has
never recognized any claims to sovereignty over territory in the Antarctic regions asserted by any
foreign state. No member of the U.S. Antarctic Service shall take any action or make any
statements tending to compromise this position. Members of the Service may take any appropriate
steps such as dropping written claims from airplanes, depositing such writings in cairns, et cetera,
which might assist in supporting a sovereignty claim by the U.S. Government. Careful record shall
be kept of the circumstances surrounding each such act. No public announcement of such act
shall, however, be made without specific authority in each case from the Secretary of State." 2
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1248 (1963).
"In accepting the invitation of the United States to participate in the conference to draft the
Antarctic Treaty, the Soviet government stated: "that it has not recognized and cannot recognize
as legitimate any kind of separate solution for the problem of territorial possession in the Antarc-
tic....
The Soviet Union reserves to itself all rights based on discoveries and explorations of Russian
navigators and scientists, including the right to present corresponding territorial claims in the Ant-
arctic." 2 WHITEMAN, id., at 1254-1955.
"The seven claimant States and five States which had not made claims mentioned above.
"See U.S. Proposes Conference on Antarctica, 38 DEPT. STATE BULL. 910 (June 2, 1959).
"Done at Washington, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. Brazil,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Romania have also
ratified the treaty. See TREATIES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1976 315 (1976).
"Id., Art. I, I.
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of a military nature are prohibited, including "the establishment of military
bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the
testing of any type of weapons." 9 Provision is made for freedom of scientific
investigation and scientific cooperation."0 To a large extent the Antarctic Trea-
ty is an effort to preserve Antarctica exclusively for scientific research.
The treaty approaches the problem of sovereignty by laying aside all ter-
ritorial claims, or "freezing" the claims, as long as it remains in force.', No
party to the treaty renounces previously asserted rights, and nothing occuring
while the treaty is in force prejudices such rights." Activities under the treaty
regime cannot be the basis for asserting a new claim or enlarging an existing
claim.23 "Freezing" the territorial claims was essential to the success of the
Antarctic Treaty. Most of the claimant States, including Argentina, Chile,
France, and Australia, insisted that such a provision be included in the treaty.
Both the United States and the USSR had reserved their rights, and were
equally protected.2"
The treaty bans nuclear explosions in Antarctica" and was the first
multilateral agreement to establish such a ban. When the Antarctic Conference
was first convened, the draft treaty had no provision covering nuclear explo-
sions. The ban was added to meet the concerns of Southern Hemisphere na-
tions which feared fallout from atmospheric tests.2 6
Article VI delineates the "area" which is covered by the Antarctic Treaty:
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60 South
Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or
in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under interna-
tional law with regard to the high seas within that area."
The "area" covered by Article VI must be explained in detail. Underneath the
ice cap, Antarctica has a different configuration from what is seen on the map.
If the ice cap should melt, the continent itself would be much smaller and a
considerable portion of West Antarctica would be sea, dotted with islands.
There is no problem including Antarctic land above sea level in the "area"
covered by the treaty. There is also little doubt that land below sea level, which
is covered by solid ice, is included in the treaty.2s The status of the ice shelves,
191d.




", See J. Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INT. & CoMP. L. Q., 436, 468 (1960).
"Art. V, I1, supra note 17.
16 See supra note 24, at 467.
I'Supra note 17.
"See M. Mouton, The International Regime of the Polar Regions, 107 RECUEIL DES COURS 168,
195 (1962).
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which are attached to the land and float on water, might be more questionable
but for the fact that they are expressly made part of the "area" in accordance
with Article VI.
Beyond the ice shelves is a belt of drifting ice called "pack ice" which sur-
rounds Antarctica for hundreds of miles. During the winter the pack ice is
somewhat solid, but it is constantly broken by storms and ice floes drifting in
the north. Since Article VI expressly provides for ice shelves to be included as
part of the "area" of Antarctica, it may be assumed that the pack ice is not in-
cluded within the treaty.29 The fact that the pack ice is separated from the solid
land and ice mass lends further support to this view.
After delineating the "area" to which the Antarctic Treaty applies, Article
VI expressly excludes rights on the high seas. The treaty thus does not apply to
the oceans, and does not interfere with the traditional freedom of the seas."
The effect of Article VI is to create two legal regimes in the area south of 600
South Latitude. One regime exists in the "area," the Antarctic territory
assimilated to land, where measures of a military nature as well as nuclear ex-
plosions are prohibited.3" Another regime exists in the Antarctic Ocean where
the general regime of the high seas determines the legal norms. 2
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty does not delineate the extent of the high
seas south of 600 S latitude. Taubenfeld says that in "view of the existing con-
troversies over the breadth of the territorial sea, the question of what con-
stitutes the high seas was intentionally left vague." 33 Since the distinction be-
"See J.P. Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CALIF. W. INT. L. J., 297, 308 (1975).
"The freedom of the seas concept is codified in the Convention on the High Seas. Done at
Geneva, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. Article 2 contains the
following provisions: "The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the condi-
tions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter
alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States: (1) Freedom of navigation; (2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law,
shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exer-
cise of the freedom of the high seas."
"Arts. I and V, supra note 17.
"According to oneauthority, "the presence of nuclear weapons, the testing of any non-nuclear
weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers are admissible in the waters and airspace of the
high seas of . . . the Southern Ocean." J. Kish, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 180 (1973).
Kish does not say that nuclear weapon tests are permissible on the Antarctic high seas. His hesita-
tion is explained by the fact that it is unclear whether general international law permits nuclear
tests on the high seas and the airspace above them. The point is, however, that the Antarctic Ocean
is no different from other high seas in this regard. Since Article V of the Antarctic Treaty does not
apply, the only conventional limitation is the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Done at Moscow, August
5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1-313, T.I.A.S. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. Nations such as France, which have not
ratified the latter treaty, suffer no conventional limitations if they choose to conduct nuclear tests
on the high seas off Antarctica.
11H. Taubenfeld, A Treatyfor Antarctica, 531 INT. CONCILIATION 243, 285-86 (January 1961).
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tween the two legal regimes in Antarctica is determined by the extent of the
high seas, it is desirable to clear up this vagueness. Article I, paragraph I of the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone " extends the
sovereignty of a State beyond its land territory to the territorial sea. The
regime of the territorial sea is thus dependent on the existence of sovereignty
over land territory. While the Antarctic Treaty is in force, there is no generally
recognized State sovereignty over Antarctica, and therefore, there is no ter-
ritorial sea.35
Is it possible that the high seas regime extends to all Antarctic waters? The
answer would appear to be in the affirmative. Article I of the 1958 Convention
on the High Seas defines the high seas to include "all parts of the sea that are
not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." 36 Inter-
nal waters include rivers, bays, and harbors where a State exerts sovereignty
equal to the sovereignty it exerts over land.3" The concept of internal waters
may never be applicable to the interior of Antarctica where a permanent ice
pack covers the land. But, States could conceivably claim an internal water
status for bays or harbor areas which are free of ice during certain periods.
While the Antarctic Treaty is in force, claims to internal waters will have no
more validity than claims to land. In the absence of internal waters and ter-
ritorial seas, all Antarctic waters may be considered part of the high seas.3
The Antarctic Treaty establishes a mechanism for future political coopera-
tion among the contracting parties.3 9 Consultative meetings are to be held
periodically to consider and recommend "measures in furtherance of the prin-
ciples and objectives of the Treaty.""0 The measures take effect when they
receive unanimous approval. Only contracting parties which are original
signatories or conduct substantial scientific activities in Antarctica may par-
ticipate in the consultative meetings, and are required to approve the measures
in order for them to take effect.
Finally, the treaty provides for amendments, modifications, and
withdrawal." It may be amended and modified at any time by unanimous
"Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Article I,
paragraph I provides that "The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its in-
ternal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea."
"See supra note 28, at 196.
"Supra note 30.
"A State's sovereignty over internal waters is more complete than its sovereignty over the ter-
ritorial sea because other States have the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Arti-
cle 14 of the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone defines the right of inno-
cent passage. See supra note 34.
"See supra note 32, at 34.
"Art. IX, supra note 17.
0Id.
"Id. Art. XII.
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agreement of the group of privileged contracting parties which participate in
the consultative meetings."2 Any other contracting party may either consent to
the change within two years or withdraw from the treaty. Provision is also
made for an elaborate procedure 3 which, in effect, permits the treaty to be ter-
minated after thirty years."
New Developments and the Treaty Regime
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to potential problems posed to
the treaty regime by resource exploitation, and possible solutions to these
problems. The basic problem with resource exploitation is that it raises the
question of territorial sovereignty. The Antarctic Treaty could shelve the issue
of territorial sovereignty because scientific exploration may be accomplished
without reference to title. Mineral and petroleum exploitation face the issue of
title directly. Companies, whether public or private, are not likely to initiate
commercial exploitation of these resources unless title is secure.
Exploitation of living resources and icebergs also creates problems with ter-
ritorial sovereignty. Krill, icebergs, and marine mammals are concentrated
within 200 miles of the Antarctic continent. A growing number of States are
extending their jurisdiction over ocean resources to within 200 miles of the
coast." The most likely result of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference is to pro-
vide the coastal State with a 200-mile economic zone with sovereign rights over
the exploitation of all resources, living and nonliving, in the water column and
seabed below.4 6 These developments put an added strain on the question of
Antarctic sovereignty. When the Antarctic Treaty was drafted, most claimant
States would not have asserted rights beyond a narrow territorial sea. Today, a
"I1d., 1.
"Id., 1 2.
"Since no termination date is given, the treaty theoretically remains in force indefinitely. But,
after 30 years any of the same privileged contracting parties is entitled to request a conference of
all the contracting parties "to review the operation of the Treaty." Any modification or amend-
ment which is approved at such a conference by a majority of the contracting parties, including a
majority of the privileged parties, will be submitted for ratification. The change will not enter into
force unless it is unanimously ratified by the privileged parties. After two years, if the change does
not enter into force, any contracting party may give notice of withdrawal from the treaty. The
"withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the notice of the depository Govern-
ment." It was the intent of the framers of the Antarctic Treaty that if a majority desired changes
and could not agree on them after thirty years, the treaty settlement should be abandoned. See
supra note 24, at 473.
"See A.L. Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT. L. 494 (1977).
Hollick points out that some of the new claims, such as that of the United States, have been limited
to fisheries, while others, mostly Latin American nations, have claimed a 200-mile territorial sea.
"See J. Stevenson and B. Oxman, The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 69 AM. J.
INT. L. 763, 764 (1975).
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claim to sovereignty would naturally give rise to an economic zone beyond the
continental sector.4 7
The views of the various States on resource exploitation can be expected to
reflect their underlying position on Antarctic sovereignty. Dr. Robert E.
Hughes, U.S. representative to the 8th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting,
made this point in Oslo on June 12, 1975:
Those countries who do not recognize claims to sovereignty would surely have to
assert the right to commence mineral resource activities at their will .... Those who
have made claims to sovereignty would contest that view."
Although Dr. Hughes speaks of mineral exploitation, the same point would
appear to apply to all resources. The argument is that in the absence of
sovereignty, there are no restrictions on resource exploitation except perhaps
for treaty prohibitions. The claimant States would argue to the contrary that
they have title to all resources in their respective sectors, and no exploitation
may take place without their permission.
The Antarctic Treaty contains no specific reference to commercial resource
activity. Views as to the implication of the treaty may be expected to reflect
once again the underlying positions on territorial sovereignty. The State
Department has taken the position that mineral resource activities would fall
within the peaceful purposes permitted in accordance with Article I of the An-
tarctic Treaty."9 In a broad sense, this position would permit exploitation at
the present time, as long as the particular commercial activity conforms with
other provisions of the treaty. 0
A contrary view states that since the Antarctic Treaty does not directly
govern resource exploitation, any action-
aimed at commercial exploitation of mineral resources would be contrary to the pur-
poses and objectives of the Treaty and therefore should be considered a violation of
"Unilateral state practice and the negotiating texts of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference in-
dicate a trend towards general acceptance of the 200-mile economic zone. Unilateral and
multilateral efforts appear to be reinforcing each other in this area. See supra note 45; B.H. Ox-
man, The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 N. Y. Sessions, 71 AM. J. INT.
L. 247, 250 (1977).
4E. McDowell, supra note 13, at 106.
"Legal Status of Areas South of 60° South Latitude, Dept. of State memorandum, in U.S. Ant-
arctic Policy: Hearing on U.S. Policy with Respect to Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in
the Antarctic Before the Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 19 (1975) (hereinafter cited as 1975 Hear-
ing).
"It has been suggested that the relevant provisions would include: (1) freedom of scientific in-
vestigation (Article 11), (2) exchange of information and research (Article III), (3) inspection by
designated observers (Article VII), and (4) the obligation to provide notice of expeditions (Article
VII). See Antarctic Resources, Report from the meeting of experts of the Fridtjof Nansen Founda-
tion at Polh6gda, May 30-June 10, 1973, 1975 Hearing, id.,at 79.
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the Treaty if undertaken before the consent of all consultative parties to the action
has been given. "i
The claimant States are likely to take this point of view because it would pro-
hibit exploitation without their permission, and therefore, indirectly support
the argument that they have exclusive rights to the resources in their respective
sectors.2
Resource exploitation was not discussed at the consultative meetings held
during the first ten years of the Antarctic Treaty's existence. The primary
reason why there was no discussion was the fear on the part of some States
"that any multilateral approach (to resource exploitation) would be detrimen-
tal to their territorial claims."II Discussion of mineral resources at the seventh
consultative meeting in 1972 revealed the basic sensitivity of the issue. Agree-
ment could only be reached to postpone discussion until the eighth con-
sultative meeting in Oslo so that governments would have time to carefully
consider their positions." Discussion up to and including the Oslo meeting was
limited to mineral and petroleum resources.
The United States had a difficult time preparing its position for the Oslo
meeting. The Antarctic Policy Group, part of the National Security Council,
began to consider the question of mineral and petroleum exploitation in 1970.
A classified National Security Decision Memorandum concluded in early 1973
that the United States should seek an agreement that would exclude unilateral
resource exploitation in Antarctica." The Arab oil embargo followed in the
fall of 1973. As a result of the energy crisis, the Federal Energy Administration
and the Department of the Interior sought to have the above memorandum
amended." For awhile there was considerable doubt whether the energy
bureaucracy would win out. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oceans
and International Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
May of 1975 reveals that the energy bureaucracy lost the battle." The United
States went to Oslo fully committed to finding an international solution to the
Antarctic mineral resource issue.58
'1d.
"A claim of exclusive rights to resources has as a corollary that others must obtain permission to
exploit those resources. The right to deny such permission would therefore lend support to the ex-
clusive claim.
"Statement of Dixy Lee Ray, Assistant Secretary of State and Chairman, Antarctic Policy
Group, 1975 Hearing, supra note 49, at 5.
"See id.
"See D. Shapley, Antarctica's Future: Will Oslo Talks on Resources Mean that Scientists Have
to Move Over? 187 SCIENCE 820, 821 (March 7, 1975).
56Id.
"See supra note 53, at 6.
"See D. Shapley, North Pole, South Pole Resources Eyed, 189 SCIENCE 365 (Aug. 1, 1975).
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The Oslo meeting was held in June 1975. No binding agreement was made
with regard to Antarctic resources. Instead, the conference manifested a con-
sensus as to the need for an international approach." This consensus does not
necessarily indicate any resolution of the underlying positions of States on the
question of sovereignty, or whether the treaty impliedly permits resource ex-
ploitation. The Final Report of the eighth consultative meeting in Oslo-
noted that all governments represented ... urge states and persons to refrain from
actions of commercial exploration and exploitation while, acting as Consultative Par-
ties, they seek timely agreed solutions to the problems raised by the possible presence
of valuable mineral resources in the Antarctic Treaty Area."
Several of the treaty nations have pressed for a moratorium on mineral and
petroleum exploitation." The United States-
has resisted any formal moves in this direction, but has adopted an interim policy of
opposing actions by any nation with the purpose of commercial exploitation and ex-
ploration of Antarctic mineral resources and urging other nations to join the U.S. in
such an interim policy. 2
The Final Report of the Oslo consultative meeting cited above, in effect,
adopts the interim policy of the United States. One important aspect of any in-
terim policy is the question of licensing. It is unlikely that a private company
would attempt mining or drilling operations in Antarctica unless it was li-
censed to do so by its State of origin. The interim policy adopted at Oslo will
probably endure if treaty nations continue to refrain from issuing such
licenses.
Plans were made in Oslo to discuss mineral and petroleum resources at a
meeting in Paris the following summer. The Paris meeting was held in July of
1976. The issues discussed were considered so sensitive that the participating
nations decided against issuing any communique or even indicating the
presence of their representatives in Paris.63
The United States raised the issue of krill exploitation at a meeting held in
London from March 14 to 18, 1977 preparatory to the ninth consultative con-
ference.6 4 After discussion of a number of proposals, it was unanimously
decided to take up the question at the forthcoming meeting.65 The ninth con-
"See statement by Dr. Richard E. Hughes, U.S. representative to the 8th Antarctic Treaty Con-
sultative Meeting, in a telephone interview, W. Sullivan, Resource Study in Antarctica Set, N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1975, at 9, col. I.60E. McDOWELL, supra note 13, at 107.
"See supra note 53, at 6.
21d., at 6-7.
'See C. Farnsworth, 12 Nations Conclude Secret Meeting in Paris on Possible Exploitation of
Antarctic Minerals After 1989, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1976, at 5, col. 2.
"See D. Shapley, Antarctic Problems: Tiny Krill to Usher in New Resource Era, 196 SCIENCE
503, 504 (April 29, 1977).
"Id.
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sultative conference ended in London on October 7, 1977. Although the
meetings were held in closed session, some of the results have been disclosed.
The participating nations decided to produce a set of interim guidelines for
catching krill while detailed plans on long-term arrangements are worked
out.66 The arrangements are likely to provide for pooling information about
krill and to impose limits on catching krill.6' The conference also came to the
conclusion that it would be necessary to conduct scientific and ecological
surveys before any attempt is made to exploit the mineral or petroleum
resources of Antarctica.65 This position is consistent with the moratorium on
commercial exploitation of these resources urged at the Oslo session in 1975.
Three basic options would appear to be available to the treaty nations in
dealing with the future explotiation of all Antarctic resources. The first is to
completely prohibit all commercial activity on the continent, the continental
shelf, and in the waters within a 200-mile radius. The advantage of a prohibi-
tion is to preserve the Antarctic continent and surrounding waters for scientific
research, the major purpose of the present treaty regime. It is unlikely that this
option will be available if commercial production of the various resources
mentioned above becomes cost effective. As food, water, and energy become
increasingly scarce, nations will probably not refrain from tapping new
sources.
The second option is to provide for international regulation of commercial
activities in Antarctica. The nations which take part in the consultative
meetings under the Antarctic Treaty are already moving in this direction. The
problems with this option are substantive, procedural, and administrative.
The substantive problem of permitting resource exploitation under interna-
tional regulation relates to the underlying issue of sovereignty. The U.S. posi-
tion is to permit-
free access to all parts of the area, except specially designated areas (for environ-
mental reasons), to develop natural resources under uniform and nonpreferential
rules applicable to all nations. 9
Since the United States does not recognize any Antarctic claims, free access
and equal treatment are consistent with its juridical position. The opposite
would be true for the claimant States. Their juridical positions would demand
a policy which denied resource exploitation without permission in their respec-
6See A. MacLead, Sharing Antarctica's Riches, Christian Sci. M., October 11, 1977, at 4, col.
1.
6 7See R. D. Hershey Jr., Exploration of Antarctica May Not Be Good for It, N.Y. Times, Oct.
9, 1977, § 4 (Week in Review), at 7, col. 1.
"See supra note 66.
6'Supra note 53, at 16.
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tive sectors. The question may be asked if any compromise is possible between
these positions. One possibility is a type of decreasing preferential treatment.70
This approach would give first option or a percentage of revenue to claimant
States during the early years of commercial exploitation. A timetable could be
established so that all distinctions were eventually eliminated. The system
would operate best if no reference were made to sectors. For example, it would
be better to allocate a percentage of the total Antarctic revenue to the claimant
States rather than a percentage of the revenue in their respective sectors. This
approach would make preferential treatment more acceptable to the non-
claimant States.
International regulation of commercial activities faces the procedural prob-
lem of incorporation within the present treaty regime. The U.S. position is to
avoid, if possible, reopening the treaty.7 ' The United States would probably
prefer to have all negotiations conducted between the contracting parties who
are privileged to attend consultative meetings under Article IX of the treaty.
Meetings are currently being conducted with this group of nations. Measures
dealing with international regulation of commercial activities could be adopted
unanimously by the same group in accordance with Article IX.
There would appear to be little problem dealing with commercial activities
on the continent, the "area" assimilated to land, by approving measures under
Article IX. The more difficult procedural problem is resource exploitation in
Antarctic waters. It has been determined that all waters off Antarctica, in-
cluding floating ice, have the status of high seas, and therefore are excluded
from the treaty regime in accordance with Article VI."1 For this reason, the in-
ternational regulation of krill and iceberg production could probably not be
dealt with by measures under Article IX. Other procedural methods could be
employed instead. One possibility is a separate convention, an approach that
was taken with Antarctic seals. 3 This alternative would probably be best since
it avoids interference with the present treaty regime. The less desirable
"It has been suggested that the parties to the Antarctic Treaty grant concessions as a group with
royalties paid into a common fund. See E. Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic
Treaty Collaboration, 68 AM. J. INT. L. 217, 224 (1974). It is unlikely that such a plan would be ac-
ceptable to the claimant States unless they were to initially share in the fund on a preferential basis.
New Zealand officials, for example, have indicated that they expect some form of preferential
treatment for claimant States. See W. Sullivan, 19 Countries to Discuss Antarctic Resources, N.Y.
Times, January 17, 1977, at 35, col. 6.
"See supra note 53, at 22.
"See pp. 6-9 infra.
"See Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, negotiated at London, February 3-11,
1972, 11 INT. LEGAL MATERIALS 251 (1972). The United States became the fifth nation to ratify the
convention on Dec. 28, 1976. See 76 DEPT. STATE BULL. 135 (Feb. 14, 1977). Ratification by 7 of
the 12 signatories is necessary for the convention to enter into force.
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possibilities are amendment or modification of the treaty in accordance with
Article XII, paragraph 1. An amendment which simply attached to the treaty a
procedure for the international regulation of krill and icebergs might not be
any more disruptive of the present regime than a separate convention. An
amendment or modification of Article VI, so as to revise the definition of the
"area" to include Antarctic waters, probably has the most potential for
disruption.7 '
One significant question is whether commercial activities on the continential
shelf could be fit within the framework of measures adopted under Article IX,
or rather are to be included along with krill and icebergs in a separate conven-
tion or amendment to the treaty. This paper has drawn a sharp distinction be-
tween the "area" assimilated to land under Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty
and the waters and floating ice which are considered high seas. The continental
shelf, as a legal concept, is similar to the territorial sea in that it is dependent
upon the sovereignty of the coastal State over the adjacent land mass."5 In the
absence of sovereignty under the treaty regime, there would be no continental
shelf just as there is no territorial sea. Of course, the continental shelf exists in
a geographical sense, and would have a legal status just as the deep seabed
beyond national jurisdiction possesses a legal status.
The absence of a territorial sea means that all Antarctic waters are high seas,
and therefore, outside the treaty regime in accordance with Article VI. But, the
continental shelf cannot be assimilated to the high seas for the obvious reason
that it is not water. To the extent that the continental shelf may be assimilated
to land, it might be included as part of the Antarctic "area" under Article VI.
This would make it possible to adopt measures for the international regulation
of commercial activities on the continental shelf under Article IX. The advan-
tage of this approach is to combine the regulation of petroleum and mineral
activities on the continent and the continental shelf in one procedural system.
The administrative problem with international regulation of resource ex-
ploitation relates to whether an international authority should be set up to
issue licenses or conduct commercial operations.7 6 One possible alternative to
"Such a revision is likely to raise the question of sovereignty over the 200-mile resource zone
beyond the present treaty "area." To the extent that the "area" is defined so as not to include the
waters beyond, it gives the 200-mile resource zone the status of high seas. If the definition of the
"area" were revised so as to include the 200-mile resource zone, it could lend support to the argu-
ment that a claimant State has the right to a 200-mile resource zone in the absence of or at the ter-
mination of the Antarctic Treaty.
1"... the rights of the coastal state in respect to the area of continental shelf that constitutes a
natural prolongation of its land territory exist ipso facto and ab initio by virtue of its sovereignty
over the land." North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (1969) I.C.J. 3, 22.
"One precedent for an international authority is the machinery being formulated for the deep
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an international authority is a scheme whereby contracting parties issue
licenses subject to conditions laid out in agreed arrangements. The advantages
of national licensing include:
its simplicity, lack of cost and its consequential avoidance of all the problems said to
be inherent in the establishment of an international authority-its location, staffing,
powers, cost, etc.' 7
Claimant States are likely to fear that an international authority is inconsis-
tent with their sovereign rights. 8 The more powerful the authority, the more
danger the claimant States would fear. For this reason it is unlikely that the
authority will be given the power to actually conduct commercial activities. If
the authority merely licensed States or their nationals, it would probably be
more acceptable to the claimant States.
The last option available to the treaty nations in dealing with the future ex-
ploitation of Antarctic resources is to do nothing at all. The danger with this
option is obvious. If the exploitation of any of the resources mentioned in this
paper becomes cost effective, there is a significant chance that States with ter-
ritorial claims will decide to assert them in order to take advantage of the
resources themselves. At that point, international conflict could break out,
and the treaty would eventually be meaningless. For this reason, the option of
doing nothing is really not an option at all. The treaty nations will hopefully
have enough foresight to avoid such a possibility.
Conclusion
This paper begins with the hypothesis that Antarctica is increasingly impor-
tant because of its resources. The question which follows from that hypothesis
is whether the legal status quo in Antarctica can withstand the stress posed by
future resource exploitation. The answer is dependent on the will of the na-
tions with Antarctic interests. Most commercial activities in Antarctica are
only gradually reaching the planning stage. Production has not begun with any
resource except krill. This would appear to be the time for States to take action
before the realization of benefits from commercial activities hardens national
positions. The treaty nations have already commenced discussion leading to an
seabed at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. For an analysis of the possible struc-
ture of the deep seabed authority, see J. Charney, The International Regime for the Deep Seabed:
Past Conflicts and Proposals for Progress, 17 HARV. INT. L.J. 1 (1976).
"Supra note 50, at 83.
7'An international authority, like any international organization, intrudes upon the sovereign
rights of a State. But, an international authority which functions to exploit resources appears
especially intrusive because resource exploitation, either directly or through licensing and regula-
tion, is a major State function.
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international solution for resource exploitation." International regulation
would appear to be the best alternative if the treaty regime is to be preserved.
The substantive, procedural, and administrative problems of international
regulation have been examined. Each of these problems may be resolved
without sacrificing the treaty regime. In the final analysis, it is the ability of the
treaty nations to cooperate that will make the difference. Since the Antarctic
Treaty has stood as a model of international cooperation from the very begin-
ning, it is not unrealistic to expect that the treaty nations will find a solution
that is compatible with the present treaty regime.
"See pp. 16-18, infra.
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